On any election day, interested ciu7.cns want to know one thing-who woo. News organi7.ations are in the business of geuing accurate rc$ultS to !heir liudience as quickl y as possible. but coun ting actual votes takes hours, and sometimes days.
The system was economical. and it was fast. But was it accurate? The answer: not as accumte or as reliable as it was intended, promised, or needed to oc, especially when it eame to calling a very elose race. We learned that answer on election night 2000. At the core of the reporting problem were two mistaken projections in one state, Florida, which turned out to be key to the outcome of the national election. TIle television networks and other news outlets twice projected the winner and twice recalled those projections. News executives, particularly television news executives, as well as editors, correspondents, and prod UCCf"S themselves dcscribed election-night covcrage as a '·debacle:' a "disaster," and a ·'fiasco.'" Something had gone wrong-tcnibly wrong-in the polling and projection system. It is not the purpose of this anicle to fcrret out the exact sources of the errors on that night. The experiences of election night 2000 do. however. serve as a useful lens through which to examine the overall efficacy of the system that was in place. It is my contention that this system is too fr.l.ught with the potcntial for error for news organi7.ations to rely on its projections in the way that they havc in the recent past.
Background
Several reports and reviews were commissioned by the networks to exami ne the pcrfonnance of television news on election night 2000. (For funher infonnation, see the aniele by Fr.l.nkovie in this symposium, and the full network reports in the appendix in the electronic version of the journal.) CNN asked thrce journalists, Ben Watte nberg, Jim Risser, and me. to constitute an indepe ndent panel to investigate its performance on clection night to detcnnine the following: What went wrong'! Why did it happen? What should be done I. We shoukl DC)Ie. also. that 1-lorida Wa!i DOt the only itaIe in the 2000 election in whi<;:h projections _re made based on exit polls and models that later were rct..,tcd. MiSIa,k~n calls w~re made in New Muioo and Washingtoo Stale. and DOl unLiI ...0'" "'liable and compleIC iDforlt!lll.ioo Ix:came avaiJ .. 1e. were !he actual outcomes in those ~ knoWD.
to guard against a recurrence in fmurc elections (Konner. Risser. and Wattenberg 2OO1)?
In o ur report to G'lN, we said that among the most obvious failings were an emphasis on speed over accuracy in rcporting; excessive competition and lhe pressure to come in flfSl; outdated technology; human error; a nawed polling and projection system; and. finally. overconfidence in the system and in the polls themselves. We Slated. "On elcclion day 2000, television news organizations staged a collective dr.lg rnce o n the crowded high way of democracy, rcckJessly endangering the electoral process, the politicaJ life of the country and their own credibility, all for reasons that may be conceptually nawcd.and commercially questionable." (The full text of our report is included in the electronic version of thc joumaJ as an appendix to this symposium)
The failure of the IlCWS media and all that followed from it may be unforgivable, but it was oot unforeseeable. Although election polli ng and projcction techniques have grown increasingly sophisticated and reliable over the more than )0 years during which the systems have been evolving, their p0-tential for error has nOl been eliminated. Estimates made from models and samplcs arc always subjcct to a margin of error and built-in distortions, factors taken into account by the professionals. However, in addition to factors that are subject to calcul able margins of e rror, various nonsampIing factors., the effects of which are more difficult to gauge. have surfaced over lime, for example, increasing nu mbers of early and absentee voters, increasing nonresponse in exil polls, and misreponing of vote retums. 1llese no nsampling factors can distort the res ul ts. More than 01lC factor can act simul lanCOusly, and the errors can be reenforcing in specific instances. In very close races. the variables can lead to significant and COStly error. In the case of elcction 2<XX1, they did.
Before election 2000, the system had performed remarkably well . Mistakes were made in the past. but they were few in number and never as damaging as they would be in election 2000. Now we have the experi ence that. alleast in very close races like the Bush-Gore one, the system has provcn itself \0 be much less reliable than the public has been led to believe, and perhaps less reliable than even the professionals had thought.
Much of what follows is developed from material and infonnalion gathered for "Televisio n's Perfonnance on Ek."Ction Night 2000: A Repan for CNN" (Konncr, Risser, and Wattenberg 200 1). I periodically quote from interviews conducted in conncction with Lhc preparation of thaI repon. The reader should note that I undenake this review as a journalist. not an expen on paUing or statislical methods. I shall aucmpt to layout the case fo r caution, based on what we learned in preparing our repon.
.,
CHECKED 4
Konner The System and How It Works Voter News Service (VNS), the pooled exit polling, vote tabulation, and outcome projection service in place for election day 2000, was fonned in 1993 through a merge r of two predecessor organizations. The mcm~h ip was talcr expanded and the organi7.ation was modified in its structure. For this election, VNS was funded and operated by a consortium of five television networks (ABC, CBS, CNN. Fox News, and NBC) and the Associated Press. and in 2000 it operated under a single head. It gathered preelection data.
conducted exit polls. collected actual VOle resu lts. and projected winners. Many prim and broadcast outlets subscribed to the service. All relied on VNS data on eJection night. The b udget of VNS was $35 million. $33 million o f it from the networks and the AP. a.nd the rest (rom subscribers.
Voter News Service engaged in scvcr.tJ data collection operations: exit polls in sample precincts, and vote tabulations from a largcr sample, including tabulations from a selected group that reported early. It also obtaincd actual tabulated vote totals from a largcr group of sample precincts and vote tabulations from cvcry county. In addition, VNS did its own analysis of the data and made predictions.
Thc data collected by VNS were processed through a series of calculations and decision models. Decision models wcre designed on the basis of preelection researc h, polling, and analysis, including data on voter charncteristics in selected coun ties and sample precincts and analys is of voting paUerns in prior races. This preelection research provided key elements of the decision modcls by which the eleclion-day data were to be evaluatcd.
All the information was processed through various computer models and transmiued to members and s ubscribers for all House, Senate. and guberna· torial races, as well as the state-by-state vote for PrcsidcnL Projections were made from a numbcT or sample precincts, which were intended to mirror the wider population. A subset of this sample of precincts is selectcd for exit polling. In Rorida, 120 precincts out of 5,885 were designated sample precincts, for which quick reporting of results 10 VNS was prearrangcd. Exit polling was conducted in 45 of these precincts. In these precincts, voters were sampled systematically, wi th sample sizes set to keep sampling error withi n tolerable limits. Selected voters indicated who they thought they had just voted for by fil ling OUi questionnaires that also included questions about issues and key demogrJphics. 1lte results from the exit poll precincts were used to call races before tabulal.cd actual resul ts wcre in hand if the decision models dctennincd Ihat a candidate had a sufficient lead in the exit polL In very close races. a call must wait until Ihe t.1bu lation of a significant number of actual votes from sample precincts. Whcn !.here wcre consistent indications of a clear Icad for a candidate. VNS made the call for the estimated winner.
Voter News Service was only one part of the system of decision maki ng on election nighL Its call is not the call thaI reaches viewcrs and voters. The El ection 2000 Symposium CHECKED § networks and I~WS organizations also had their own decision desks to analyrJ: and imerpret the VNS data; CNN and CBS collabor.lted with a shared decision desk. The decision desks wcre eharged with making projections. inde pendent of other news organizations. based on the data and information received. They would then make their recommendations to the news executi ves in charge, who would authorize the information that was given to the publ ic. The news decision desks varied from VNS calls and projections several limes during the coverage thai evening. At times VNS led the networks; at other times VNS foll owed or, as it turned out in the network call for Bush, VNS did not make the call at all.
Thus, it is Lhe ind ividuals at the decision desks in each of the news organizations who arc responsible for making the calls that arc announced to the pu blic as "projected winners." Those on the decision desk arc experienced analysts of the ki nd of data that reaehes them from VNS. They look: at the constantl y changi ng, multiple screens of data provided to them via VNS computer hookups, and they interpret these data. They the n make their recommendations to the responsible news personnel, and the news executi ves make. or auiliorize, the call . They do so in a context where minutes count and compcli tive pressures are prominent. As stated in CBS's postelection report, "the Election Night broadcast occurs in a cauldron of competiti ve heat" with each individual and each network burning to be the besl and the first.
TIlere were other sources of data and information available as well. The AP had its own data collection system, not as comprehensive as VNS's, but ava ilable to all AP subscribers, including the networks. The AP's votc-counling system was nOt tied into the VNS system. Official Slale. county. and local vote tabulations were also available, albeit on a slower timetable. BUI as emerged in the several postmonems. in the race to be first. despite many warning flags concerning the VNS dala throughout the evening, the backup sourees were ignored.
Unlike the IlCtwOrkS. the Ap, re lyi ng on its own independent reporting. held back from making the second, mistaken. call (for Bush). In facl VNS, acutely aware of errors in its system earlier in the evening, also held back on projecting Bush the winne r. Even without projections from VNS and the AP. all the networks plunged ahead on thai call without checking any of their other possible sourees.
In short, the news organizations re lied on a single souree of information and lacked. or did not make usc of. the checks and balances required for re liable reporti ng. The pooling concept itself explains. at least in part, why election 20Cl0 was "an accident waiting to happen." With the broad outlines of ilie system described. let us review some of the areas in which uncertainties, approx imations, random variations, omissions, and just plain mistakes can lead to wrong rcsulLs.
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Exit Polls
Exit polls arc the means of gathering data from voters after they vote, as they leave the polling ccnt.er. The exit polls are conducted throughout the day in a selected sample of precincts throughout a state. A person from the local community, trained in advance, usually distributes the question naires in the exit JXIII. The interviewer asks selected voters to fill out a questionnaire--5Qlnclimes a short questionnaire, sometimes a longer one.
Three limes during election day, the interviewer tabulates the votes from those questionnaires and calls in the information 10 VNS. The interviewer also reports informat;on about the total number of voters and the response rate 10 the exit polL The exit poll responses arc entered inlo an exit poll database. In precincts where the actual vote counts are avai lable early, they are used as a ehcck on the accuracy of the exit poll resul ts. In many elections, exit polls alone do not provide the information neccssary to call a race. In some cases, the sample is too small, and actual vO(e coun l~ are collected in the particular exit-poll precinct in order to make the projection.
In one of our interviews with Warren Mitofsky, he referred to exit polls as "blunt instruments;' meaning that many factors come into play that can distort the findings. Among the variablcs Ibat may affect accuracy arc Ibe quality of the questiOnnaire; the training and quality of the field personnel; the responsiveness of the voter and, therefore, the degree of nonresponse; the locatioo of the interviewer in relation to lhe polling location; and the truthfulness of the responses. Some voters deliberately falsify information. One known distortion in exit polls is that they tend to overrepresent Democrats, a distortion that is taken imo account in the calculations. NonrcsJXInse is a growing problem in exit polling. Added to these difficulties, different locations have different rules govern ing where the pollsters may slatld. Ma ny JXIl1ing locations have problems with several exits and vllrying restrictions and guidelines for the pollsters. Some locations require lhat pollslers stand at least 50 fcct away from the polling location. These local variables could playa role in j ust how accurate an exit poll can be. For these reasons and others, exit poll data do not always reflect the final margin. There is always sampling error. from the sample of precincts drawn and from the sample of vO(ers drawn withi n each precinct. Bill Schneider, CNN's on-air pol itical analyst, opined in an interview conducted for the CNN repon that taking exit poll information from one source is "inherently risky:'
In Florida, many of these factors came into play and were at the root of faulty results from the cxit polls. Nonrcsponse was a problem, with unknown consequences for oonresponse bias. In some cases the interviewer did not select the right voters. Some interviewers were positioned poorly. In one location, the interviewer was nO( able to intercept a singlc vOler. There were situations in which one candidate's voters seemed more willing than the other to complete exit poll questionnaires. In a postelcction memo, Warren Mitofsky, the head of the joint CBSlCNN decision desk and widely recognized as the man who bui lt the polling and projection system, reponed that at the time:
tlcearly call for Gore wa .. made, the exit poll in Tampa was offby 16 percent due to an overstatement of the vote for Gore. (lbis same figure was reported in the postelection review from Murray Edelman. the editorial director of VNS.) 'The actual vote from Tampa was not yet availab le at the lime, so the faulty exit poll formed pan of the basis of thc mistaken call for Gore. In Miami, too. the exit poll was also significantly off in favor of Gore. ( Ironically. at 7:45. just before the mistaken eall for Gore was made, according to the CNN decision team, wi th 4 percent of the vote counted, Bush, not Gore, was in the lead by 6 percem.) According to Mitofsky, other precincts were off as well because of overstatement fo r Gore. Edelman wrote. '1'hc reality is there is some risk in making calls from models" (Voter News Ser vice 2(00).
In Rorida, those who did panicipate, that is, the people who did repon how they had voted, assumed that their votes were being counted. That was not necessarily the case. Many votes were not counted. Also, many people voted incorrectly on what tunll.,od out to be a very confusing ballot Thehanging chads. Ute om-fully-perforated chads, and the butterfly ballot became famous icons of voter confusio n and disenfranchisement in the aftermath of the Aorida vote. The fai lure to recoro some intended votes may have further distorted the exit poll findings.
In a postelection review, it was also noted that VNS was able to staff only 84 percem of the sample prccillCtS nationwide (meaning lilat 16 percent of the precincts were oot covered). 1be VNS report (2001) stated that exit poll ... data were received from all but o ne precinct As the RTI repon (Biemer et al. 2001) states, "This was imjX)rtant because vote tabulations feed into the projection modcls." Moreover, there were some issues of qualilY colllrol of the data collcclion activities. both in the trai ni ng and supervision of the workers. Adequate staff goes to the very foundation of the usefulness of jX)lls.
In sum, the VNS exit polls in Aorida were judged to be inaccurate, with implications for exit polling generally. One can assume that many of the same distortions and errors occurred elsewhere, but the rdCCS were not so close as to make these varialions critical in the projections. We should note that there were problems in other states as well. In Alabama. Georgia, and Nonh Caro lina. exit polls reported a closer race than what proved to be the eventual outcome. Part of the problem was identified to be a result of too small a sample of exit poll precincts.
A postelection memo from Mitofsky and Joe Lcnski, Milofsky's associate and panncr on the decision desk, stated that o n election day 2000 VNS's cxit poll overstated the Gore vote in 22 states and overstated the Bush vote in nine states. In only 10 states, the exit polls matched actual results. The VNS jX)sldection report says its exit poll estimates showed the wrong wi nner in eight states. The fau lty exit jX)\ls actually resul ted in lilree wrong calis (Konner, Risser, and Waucnberg 200 1, app. 4). 1bc CNN rcpon concluded that exit Friday Feb 1-4 2003 0 1:25 PM 670 105 MEL Konner polls are useful for analyzi ng voting pattems after an election. They are not reliable in projecting outcomes of elections. The latte r t.ask requires a degree of precision that exit polls eannot reliably de liver whcn a race is closc.
Modeling and the Precinct Sample
Thc cxit polls teU directly what happe ned in 3 small number of sampled precincts. It is o nl y by plugging lhese resul ts into 3 large r projection model that VNS analysts are able to estimate the percentage of votes that each candidate will get statcwide. Statistical models arc complex. The choice of who and what to model is very important, and there is no escaping lhe fact that lhe projected result is driven by infonnatio n drawn from a small portion of the votes that will be casl.
All those responsible for e lection-night projections admit that no one expects models to be entirely accurate. They aeknowledge th at any estimate is an estimate only, and they operate on the assumption that there is a one·in-200 ris k of error across all races. Theseodds are based essentially on cons iderations of sampling error, and do not fully take in to account nonsampling sources of error. It is probably not well known or well ad vcniscd to the gcneral public that any statistical model can be inaccurate and that the possibil ity of error iocreascs in close elections.
The models for covering this election were built based 00 the sclection of a sample of prec1llCts and polling with in some of those precincts. (Later on election night, actual vote tabulatio ns are used 3100g with those for which only exit poll results arc known.) 1nc sampled preci ncts arc intended to mirror, statistical ly, the general population of the state. There is a potential for error in selecting sample prec incts, as well as a potential for errors in the sampling of voters. Many dynamic factors in sampling and polling makc models less stable than they may appear; among them are changes within key precincts, abse ntee and early voting, and the quality of the exit poll results that constitute the key input for thc model. We have reviewed above some of the factors affecting exit poll results.
There was another problem on this e lection ni ghL The projection of results from the sample precinCLSOnto the entire Slate was accomplished by comparing the election-night results with vote retums from the pasL Only one past race was used in this estimation procedure. Results can be skewed due to the choice of a particular prior race for comparison. In Florida, the algorithm in usc by VNS selected the 1998 gubernatorial e lection as the past race that would provide the best possible basis for projection on e lection night. It turned o ut to be the wrong race to usc. In hindsight, it was determi ned that e ither the 1996 presidential election or the 1998 Senate race would have provided 3 more useful comparison. In a dose race, every little modeling assumption counts, and so it did in this o ne. Murray Edelman's postelection report on VNS pcrfonnance (quoted in Konne r, Risser, and Wattenberg 2(01) noted that prior to this election, mooels have been used to call approximately 2000 election races, and only six errors had occurred. 111at may bave been a reason for confidence, but it should nO( have been for overconfidence. There is always a risk in making cal ls from these models, as the professionals themselves acknowledged. Small early precinct samples were a leading cause of the erroneous call for Gore early in the evening; if more precincts had been included in the exit poll, the results of the projection at that early stage may have been closer to the actual statewide result. (Later, the erroneous call for Bush revealed actual errors in the votetabulation process as well as deficiencies in the computer model's assumptions about thc outstanding vote yet to be counted.)
The RTI review (Biemer et aI. 2001) praised VNS's preelection research that went into creating the models. The research was descri bed as "appropriate" and ''wcll-dcsigncd'' with ''timely infonnation" o n voters, their prefcrences, their c haracteristics, their opinions, and more. U nothing else, what Florida provided was evidence that statistical sampling can go wrong. As o ne election consultant put it, "Sometimes good samples produce bad estimates." Statistical sampling went terribly wrong in Florida and-along with other diffieultics-cxaccrbatcd the modeling problems.
Response Rate
There is a downward trend, in ge neral, in the willingness of people to rcspond to polls. This is a growing threat to the accuracy of election polling generally. The average response rate in the 2000 exit polls was 5 1 percen\., a drop from 55 percent in 1996 and 60 percent in 1992. The pau.cm is sometimes referred to as "polling fatigue." POlling for commercial and pol.itical pwposcs is widely used-probably ovcruscd--and more and more people are refusing to panieipate. The resul t of a lower response rate is a correspondingly higher risk of nonrcsponse bias. This occurs when the votes of those who do not respond are substantially different from the votes of those who do ehoose to be part of the poll. Thal, added to traditional problems, such as individuals who eannot be contacted, ean yield a sample that is either too small or skewed. A bias in sample estimates is not to be confused with de liberate bias. Many representatives in Congress believe that both the polling and the projeetions arc deliberalely or Unconsciously biased to favor one candidate over another. We did not find any evidence to support that view. What we did find is that, in general, response rate to any sur veyor sample is a growing problem for the industry. While there is no clear evidence that nonresponse played any large role in the Florida debacle, the declining response rate leaves the syslem increasingly vulnerable to error. Thc lack of nonrcsponse bias in o ne poll or precinet docs not guarantee that it will be absent in another.
Precinct Changes
Since the projection models incorporate a direet comparison of curren t precinct resull~ with those from a past election in the same precincts, it is crucial that each precinct represent the same set of potential voters as it did in the past racc. 111c Rorida samplc precincts wcre selected from thc 1996 presidential race. Between 1996 and 2000, some precinct boundaries and names were changed by election officials. These changes sometimes produce demographic or other shifts that can make models inaccurate or obsolete. While a shift in one sample precinct can be insignificant in a race where one candidate dominates significan tly, in a very close race it can cause serious flaws in the calculations.
Early and Absentee Voting
More and more people are voting before election day and voti ng by absentee ballot. In some states. early voting is pcnnitted in specific locations. Oregon has adopted a system of voting by mail. The VNS projection model did not sufficientl y takc into account a surge in absentee ballots in Florida.
Phone sur veys were conducted by VNS in three states in which the absentee vote was expected to be especially significant-Callfomia, Oregon, and Washington. The sampling in A orida did not take into account the full weight of Rorida's absentee vote. Based on past races, VNS estimated that there would be a 7.5 percent absentee vote. In fact, 12 percent of the vote was cast by absentee ballOL Also, the absentcc vote was projected to be 15.3 percent more Republican than the election-day vote. In the final tally, the absentcc vOtC turned out to be 23.7 percent more RepUblican than !.he election-day vote.
Clearly, ror any polling information to be accurate in projecting the outcome of an election, there has 10 be some means for accounting for this growing segment of voters. Pollsters say there are ways to do this, but it would cost significantly more. It is doubtful that this kind of polling wHl be adopted unless the expense issue can be overcome. 1be increasing numbers of absentee voters may tum out to be one of the biggest problems to overcome in polli ng for the purpose of projection.
Other Issues
Therc were many other problems with the data in the Florida election. The most significant were attributable to technical and human error. a breakdown in communications, and voting irregularities. Election workers improperly entered votes into the computer. Precinct workcrs incorrectly copied or misread ballot tallies. Faulty tabulations were entered into the tolal vote. In Duval County, there was a significant key-punch error. There was an especially large error (rom Vo lusia County that exaggerated Bush's lead, A memory card malfu nctioned, This is not to mention the large number o f ballot irroguJaritics--votel'S being challenged. voter errors. and incomplcte voti ng, Errors and computer problems were not conununicated to the decision desks, At one poinl, late on election nighl, there was a serious miscalculation of the number of votes that remained to be COUnted. To be sure, some of these errors were made by local govern ment workers rathe r than VNS staff. But when the errors are large enough and not deteclCd soon enough, they affect the accuracy o f the projectcd election result.
Fo llow-up studies also revealed that there were problems with o utdated equipment. with the software. and with quality control. In sum, there was a serious underestimation o f the true total error in the eslimatcs, TIle true pr0b-ability of calling the race wrong was far greater than the "ooc·in--200" estimate that VNS had set as its guideline in building its models. Beyond that., it is questionable whe ther even those optimistic odds arc acceptable. And there is reason to wonder whether those odd~ are actuall y respected in the moment of highest heat in the "cauldron o f compcliIKm,"
The Rush to Be First
In our rcpon 10 G'lN, we wrote that the networks indulged in "cxcessivc speed" in makjng their election-night projections and calls. Predictably, those on the decision desk said that was not the case and that those who believe that the pressure to be first outweighs the pressure (Q be accura te are "cynics."
This "we saidl!.hey said" COIltroversy cries out for corrunon sense. 
Conclusion
Polling has become standard in reporti ng on elections. Findings gcncrated by the polling industry make news every day. To challenge polls or the polling system is to challenge a religion o f statistics. But polls arc statistical calculations, not facrual realities. They arc imperfect measures of voter intcDl and acrual voting, aOO their inaccuracies are especially perilous in close e lections. While the record before e lection 2000, and even for election 2000, was, for the most part, a record o f success, moch of that socccss came from e lections where the outcome was relatively clear-cut Eaeh of the postelection reports and the memornnda noted above cited problems and made I'CCQmmendations. 'They dealt with many facets of the difficulties encountered in the Florida reporti ng. But many of the problems were directly re lated to the polling and projection system. Consequenuy, there is a growing awareness that there is a need for more cautious and considered usc o f c1cction-day data derived from the exit polls.
Thc inquiry we eonducted for CNN and the judgments and recommendations we made in our repon were based on the ideals, the principles, and the best practices of journalism. We believe that all the journalists involved in election coventge at CNN subscribe to those principals. Ncvenheless, we concluded !hat because of 5CvCrai factors, CNN, along with the other telcvision networks. failed in their core mission: to inform the public accurately about the outeome of the election. We reported an impulse to speed over accuracy, and we atuibuted that impulse to the business imperativcs of television ncws--to win the highest ratings, which is not a joumaJistic standard but a commercial standard. 1be ratings drive the price of commercials, and conunercials detcnnine the bouorn-line profits of the corporations that own the news networks. There was substantial evidence in the postelection reports that the polling and projection system in place. and many of Ihe problems thai resulted, were budget driven. from outdated technology to underpaid workers. As stated by Bernard Shaw, one of the anchors of CNN's election-night coverage. '1lle network newsroom culture is that decisions are made and actions are taken in ways that are driven by ratings and profits:'
We are li ving now in the conunercial age of telcvision. The botlom line contrOls the thinking, the decisions. and the actions of lhose at the top of the corporate ladder. There is no doubt that then: is an equation between money and [ruth in news. and lhat more money is needed to improve the system.
Again and again in the postmortems, budget issues emerged as a dctcnnining factor in decisions as an answer to many of the problems. 1bc nctworks may argue that the operation is already tOO costJy, but one ean easily conclude from any of the networks' ann uaJ reporu that they can well afford it.
Some journalists feci it is irresponsible to make any projection, and that all reponing shouk! wait until actual votes are counted. Some argue that calling any race before a U the polls have closed throughout the country depresses the number of voters. Studies on this issue have nOl olTered any conclusive evidence:. In our report. we concluded lhal. polls have some value as preelection indicators and for postclection analysis. It is clear th at there is a great deal of work to be done if the polling and projection system is to be fixed .
Rerommendations
Among the recommendations thai were offered in the report to CNN were the following: Networks should emphasize accuracy over speed, and make th is com- Finally, we recogni zed in the report that the practices recommended woukl noticeably slow election-night reporting. We wrote, "Given the problems noted, we do not regard this as a bad thing. To the contrary, we believe such an outcome would result in clear benefits to JOUrnal ism and democracy."
